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I. AN INTRODUCTION: PHYSICIAN-ASSISTED 
SUICIDE & THE “RIGHT TO DIE” 
Physician-assisted suicide has been the subject of fierce 
debate over the past few decades, and there is no doubt that it is an 
extremely sensitive issue with compelling arguments from both its 
detractors and its supporters. Its opponents usually refer to the 
practice of physician-assisted suicide by either that name, simply 
“suicide,” or euthanasia.2 Advocates of physician-assisted suicide 
term the procedure as physician-assisted death, physician aid in 
dying, or “death with dignity.”3 This Note will use the term 
“physician-assisted suicide,” as that seems to be the most neutral 
way to term the practice. In order to make sure that the connotations 
behind this term are expressed correctly and persuasively, it is 
important to begin with a discussion of various terms related to the 
broader concept of “the right to die,” of which physician-assisted 
suicide is one subcategory. 
The “right to die” has developed through case law (the 
progression of which will be addressed later), and its expression 
typically refers to a patient’s right to refuse medical treatment or to 
have medical treatment withdrawn, even if either of those actions 
result in the patient’s death.4 This right is subject to heightened 
evidentiary standards that courts may impose on patients and/or 
their representatives.5 The underlying rationale behind allowing 
patients or their representatives to make such irreversible decisions 
is that patient autonomy and the preservation of dignity are implicit 
in the concept of an individual’s liberty rights.6 Be that as it may, 
the concept of the “right to die,” as opposed to the legal term, 
encompasses voluntary euthanasia, non-assisted suicide, and 
physician-assisted suicide.7 It is important to note that physician-
assisted suicide is simply a subset of this broader concept, and it is 
being developed through both courts and legislatures throughout the 
country.8 Additionally, the major distinction between the general 
																																																						
2 Annette E. Clark, Autonomy and Death, 71 TUL. L. REV. 45, 100 (1996). 
3 Katherine A. Chamberlain, Looking for a "Good Death": The Elderly 
Terminally Ill's Right to Die by Physician-Assisted Suicide, 17 ELDER L.J. 61, 65 
(2009). 
4 Physician-Assisted Suicide and the Right to Die with Assistance, 105 HARV. L. 
REV. 2021, 2021 (1992). 
5 See generally Cruzan v. Missouri, 497 U.S. 261 (1990). 
6 Jennifer Porter, Who Lives? Who Dies? Who Decides?, 14 GEO. J. L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 599, 600 (2016). 
7 Lara L. Manzione, Is There a Right to Die?: A Comparative Study of Three 
Societies (Australia, Netherlands, United States), 30 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 
443, 444 (2002). 
8 Id. 
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“right to die” as it is understood in the United States and physician-
assisted suicide as it is understood generally is that the “right to die” 
is mostly passive, while physician-assisted suicide requires the 
physician to take an active role in helping the patient achieve the 
goal of his or her death.9 
“Euthanasia” is defined as “the act or practice of killing or 
permitting the death of hopelessly sick or injured individuals (as 
persons or domestic animals) in a relatively painless way for reasons 
of mercy.”10 As with the “right to die,” physician-assisted suicide is 
simply part of this definition, although many incorrectly consider 
“euthanasia” and “physician-assisted suicide” synonymous.11 
However, using the terms interchangeably is a misnomer and 
ignores the various procedural safeguards in place for the latter. 
Relatedly, “assisted suicide” is defined as “suicide 
committed by someone with assistance from another person.”12 
Without the prefatory term “physician,” this could include all 
persons rendering suicidal aid to another, ranging from a physician 
to a friend to a complete stranger being paid for a “mercy killing.”13 
By contrast, “physician-assisted suicide” is defined as “suicide by a 
patient facilitated by means (as a drug prescription) or by 
information (as an indication of a lethal dosage) provided by a 
physician aware of the patient’s intent.”14 
This demonstrates the importance of utilizing the correct 
terminology when referring to this practice and placing it in the 
public sphere for discourse and debate, which is, as this Note will 
demonstrate, where these arguments properly belong. 
A. Current Legal Status of Physician-Assisted Suicide 
 Physician-assisted suicide is legal in a few foreign countries, 
and it is lawful in even fewer American states.15 The most liberal of 
such laws are in Belgium, a country that allows children to request 
																																																						
9 See generally Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997). 
10 “euthanasia.” Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary. 2017. 
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/euthanasia (last visited February 
2, 2017). 
11 See generally John Deigh, Physician-Assisted Suicide and Voluntary 
Euthanasia: Some Relevant Differences, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1155 
(1998). 
12 “assisted suicide.” Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary. 2017. 
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/assisted%20suicide (last visited 
February 2, 2017). 
13 Need cite and explain “mercy killing” if it is in quotes. 
14 “physician-assisted suicide.” Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary. 2017. 
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/physician-assisted%2Bsuicide 
(last visited Febuary 2, 2017). 
15 Christina Sandefur, Safeguarding the Right to Try, 49 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 513, 515-
16 (2017). 
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physician-assisted suicide as long as they are competently able to 
understand the consequences of the request.16 By contrast, the 
statutory rights that have been created in the various jurisdictions 
within the United States where physician-assisted suicide is legal are 
incredibly strict and contain a number of procedural safeguards. 
Physician-assisted suicide is currently a statutory right in Oregon, 
Washington, Vermont, California, Colorado, and the District of 
Columbia.17 It is legal at common law only in the state of Montana.18 
Before assessing these safeguards as indicating the best approach to 
obtaining and implementing physician-assisted suicide within the 
states, a brief historical overview is necessary to place the 
progression of the law in this area in its proper context. 
 
B.  Supreme Court Jurisprudence & The “Right to Die” 
 
 The first case ever to be heard by the United States Supreme 
Court regarding the issues related to “right to die” was Cruzan v. 
Director, Missouri Department of Health.19 The plaintiff, Nancy 
Cruzan, was a woman who, as a result of a car crash, was left in a 
persistent vegetative state.20 Surgeons placed a feeding tube in her 
arm for long-term support, and her parents objected to the feeding 
tube once it became apparent that Nancy would not regain her 
mental faculties.21 When her parents asked the hospital to remove 
the feeding tube, the hospital stated that it could not do so without a 
court order, which the parents subsequently sought.22 The trial court 
initially approved the court order based on evidence that Nancy had 
told a friend earlier that year that she: 
 
expressed thoughts at age twenty-five in somewhat 
serious conversation with a housemate friend that if 
sick or injured she would not wish to continue her 
life unless she could live at least halfway normally 
suggests that given her present condition she would 
not wish to continue on with her nutrition and 
hydration.23 
 
																																																						
16 See Charlotte McDonald-Gibson, Belgium Extends Euthanasia Law to Kids, 
TIME (Feb. 13, 2014), http://time.com/7565/belgium-euthanasia-law-children-
assisted-suicide. 
17 See supra note 15. 
18 Id. 
19 Cruzan v. Missouri, 497 U.S. 261, 277 (1990). 
20 Id. at 266. 
21 Id. 
22 Id. at 267. 
23 Id. at 268. 
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The State of Missouri, as well as Nancy’s guardian ad litem, 
immediately appealed the decision.24 The Missouri Supreme Court 
reversed, ruling that in the absence of a legitimate living will or clear 
and convincing evidence, a person may not refuse treatment for 
another, even a family member.25 
Nancy’s parents then petitioned the Supreme Court of the 
United States for a writ of certiorari, and the Court agreed to hear 
the case.26 The Supreme Court of the United States held that the 
State of Missouri’s “clear and convincing” evidence standard did 
not violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.27 
Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Rehnquist recognized a 
competent individual’s right to refuse life-saving medical 
treatment.28 However, the Court ruled that it was not a violation of 
the Fourteenth Amendment for a third party seeking to refuse life-
saving medical treatment for an incompetent individual to bear a 
higher burden of proof.29 The Court stated, “An incompetent person 
is not able to make an informed and voluntary choice to exercise a 
hypothetical right to refuse treatment or any other right.”30 
In her concurrence, Justice O’Connor wrote separately to 
address the issues that the Court did not decide; namely, that the 
Court was simply addressing a standard of proof as not in violation 
of the Constitution; and the Court was not deciding whether the 
Constitution required the several states to follow the directions of 
the patient’s duly appointed surrogate.31 She also noted that the 
Court also did not address the propriety of states developing other 
methods of safeguarding an incompetent individual’s liberty interest 
in refusing medical treatment.32 Justice O’Connor’s concurrence 
focused on the majority’s narrow holding.33 The line that perhaps 
best expresses the implication of the Court’s silence was this: 
“Today we decide only that one State’s practice does not violate the 
Constitution; the more challenging task of crafting appropriate 
procedures for safeguarding incompetents’ liberty interests is 
entrusted to the ‘laboratory’ of the States.”34 O’Connor observed 
that the issue was a delicate one.35 As this was the first case that the 
Supreme Court heard regarding the “right to die,” it is significant 
																																																						
24 Id. 
25 Id. 
26 Id., cert. granted, 492 U.S. 917 (1989). 
27 Id. at 286. 
28 Id. at 278. 
29 Id. at 280. 
30 Id. 
31 Id. at 289 
32 Id. at 290-92 
33 Id. 
34 Id. at 292. 
35 Id. 
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that the highest court in the federal judicial system was quick to 
defer to state interpretations of the “right to die,” and indicates, from 
the beginning of the Court’s jurisprudence, a willingness to leave 
such decisions up to the individual state. 
Following Cruzan, the next major development in Supreme 
Court jurisprudence on the “right to die” specifically addressed the 
narrower, related issue of physician-assisted suicide in a pair of 
companion cases decided on the same day – Washington v. 
Glucksberg36 and Vacco v. Quill.37 In Glucksberg, the plaintiffs 
were physicians, terminally ill patients, and a non-profit 
organization called “Compassion in Dying.”38 They challenged 
Washington’s ban against assisted suicide, claiming that it was a 
liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.39 On writ 
of certiorari, the Supreme Court held that the Due Process Clause 
did not protect the right to assistance in committing suicide.40 The 
Court reasoned that the State of Washington had an “unqualified 
interest in the preservation of human life” that was not to be weighed 
differently according to “the medical condition and the wishes of the 
person whose life is at stake.”41 The Court rejected such a “sliding-
scale approach” and gave substantial deference to the “number of 
state interests” implicated by Washington’s assisted suicide ban in 
reaching its holding.42  
In Vacco, the plaintiffs were physicians, and they challenged 
a newly enacted prohibition in the state of New York against 
physician-assisted suicide, which criminalized the action.43 The 
plaintiffs claimed the prohibition was a violation of the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution, because it treated patients with a terminal illness who 
are on life support differently than those who were not on life 
support.44 Upon writ of certiorari, the Supreme Court held that states 
have a legitimate interest in outlawing assisted suicide, and that 
“liberty” does not include a right to physician-assisted suicide.”45 
The Court again delineated a number of legitimate state interests that 
New York used to justify the ban, and further reasoned that Equal 
Protection was not violated because all individuals were subject to 
																																																						
36 Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 707-08 (1997). 
37 Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793, 797-98 (1997). 
38 Washington, 521 U.S. at 707-08. 
39 Id. 
40 Id. at 735. 
41 Id. at 729. 
42 Id. 
43 Vacco, 521 U.S. 793 at 797-98. 
44 Id. at 798. 
45 Id. at 807-09. 
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the statute and thus the prohibition did not treat individuals 
differently.46 The Court said: 
 On their faces, neither New York’s ban on assisting suicide 
nor its statutes permitting patients to refuse medical treatment treat 
anyone differently from anyone else or draw any distinctions 
between persons. Everyone, regardless of physical condition, is 
entitled, if competent, to refuse unwanted lifesaving medical 
treatment; no one is permitted to assist a suicide. Generally 
speaking, laws that apply evenhandedly to all “unquestionably 
comply” with the Equal Protection Clause.47 
In addition to court cases, some states have addressed the 
issue of “right to die” through state statute. The first state to legalize 
physician-assisted suicide, Oregon, did so through a ballot measure, 
but a lengthy injunction delayed implementation of the law until 
1997.48 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals lifted the injunction and 
determined that several patients, doctors, and residential care 
facilities (all from the State of Oregon) lacked the “injury-in-fact” 
required for standing to bring a challenge to the law, and thus the 
federal court had no jurisdiction to decide any related constitutional 
issues.49 The Supreme Court denied certiorari on the standing 
issue,50 potentially because it had already expressed its opinions 
about the “right to die” and state autonomy in developing it. The 
United States Supreme Court was silent on the issue for several 
years. 
The next Supreme Court case on this issue was brought in 
2006. In Gonzales v. Oregon, after Oregon’s Death with Dignity Act 
was passed, United States Attorney General John Ashcroft issued an 
Interpretive Rule that physician-assisted suicide was not a legitimate 
medical purpose and that any physician administering drugs to that 
effect violated the Controlled Substances Act.51 Oregon, along with 
a physician, pharmacist, and several terminally ill patients from 
Oregon, challenged the rule.52 The district court issued an injunction 
against the enforcement of the rule, which the Ninth Circuit Court 
of Appeals affirmed.53 Upon granting the Attorney General’s writ of 
certiorari, the United States Supreme Court affirmed.54 The Court 
held that the Interpretive Rule was not entitled to deference under 
several prior deferential standards established by the Court, since in 
																																																						
46 Id. at 799-800. 
47 Id. at 800. 
48 Lee v. Oregon, 891 F.Supp. 1439, 1439 (D. Oregon 1995). 
49 See Lee v. Oregon, 107 F.3d 1382 (9th Cir. 1997). 
50 Lee v. Harcleroad, cert. denied, 522 U.S. 927 (1997). 
51 Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 254 (2006). 
52 Id. at 255. 
53 Id. 
54 Id. at 275. 
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order to be given deference, “the rule must be promulgated pursuant 
to authority Congress has delegated to the official.”55 The Court 
viewed his Interpretive Rule as an improper use of power, stating: 
 
The Attorney General has rulemaking power to 
fulfill his duties under the CSA. The specific respects 
in which he is authorized to make rules, however, 
instruct us that he is not authorized to make a rule 
declaring illegitimate a medical standard for care and 
treatment of patients that is specifically authorized 
under state law.56 . . . The Government, in the end, 
maintains that the prescription requirement delegates 
to a single executive officer the power to effect a 
radical shift of authority from the States to the 
Federal Government to define general standards of 
medical practice in every locality. The text and 
structure of the CSA show that Congress did not have 
this far-reaching intent to alter the federal-state 
balance and the congressional role in maintaining 
it.57 
 
Following that decision, the Supreme Court has been silent 
on the issue, and it seems well-settled that the Courts have, at least 
incidentally, adopted Justice O’Connor’s approach in Cruzan, 
deferring to the states as to what falls within the constitutional 
bounds of the “right to die.” What follows is a history of the various 
states that have legalized physician-assisted suicide within the 
United States. 
II. PHYSICIAN-ASSISTED SUICIDE IN THE 
UNITED STATES 
Discussions of the legalization of physician-assisted suicide 
through statute began to take place as early as 1906, when a woman 
named Anna Hill, whose mother had died a particularly painful 
death from cancer, inspired legislation in Ohio that contemplated 
legalizing “voluntary euthanasia” for competent adults who were 
fatally wounded, terminally ill, or suffering from extreme pain.58 
Ultimately, the bill was defeated.59 In the following years, various 
																																																						
55 Id. at 258 
56 Id. at 258. 
57 Id. at 275. 
58 Thane Josef Messinger, A Gentle and Easy Death: From Ancient Greece to 
Beyond Cruzan Toward A Reasoned Legal Response to the Societal Dilemma of 
Euthanasia, 71 DENV. U. L. REV. 175, 189 (1993). 
59 Id. at 190. 
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individuals (both physicians and laypersons) were prosecuted for 
assisting suicides.60 The public’s attitude toward the issue vacillated 
based on the current political climate; for instance, euthanasia was 
utilized quite frequently in Nazi Germany, leading many Americans 
to abhor physician-assisted suicide as tantamount to the same 
horrible practice.61 As the right to refuse life-saving medical 
treatment began to develop, public opinion began to shift as well, 
with constituents beginning to more actively discuss the issue.62 In 
fact, a Gallup poll conducted in 1973 reported an increase in 
favorable views toward physician-assisted suicide.63 
Of course, no discussion of physician-assisted suicide would 
be complete without the man who invokes a knee-jerk thought when 
the practice is discussed – Dr. Jack Kevorkian.64 The publication of 
Dr. Kevorkian’s activism and criminal prosecution sparked a fair 
amount of public discourse.65 Dr. Kevorkian’s arguably most 
famous statement, taken (almost ironically) from a book on 
Christian ethics, perhaps best embodies the attitude of the states that 
have legalized physician-assisted suicide since 1994 – “Dying is not 
a crime.”66 
A. Progression of Valid Physician-Assisted Suicide Laws 
In 1994, Oregon became the first state to allow its residents 
suffering from terminally ill diseases or conditions to obtain lethal 
doses of medication from their treating physicians for the purposes 
of self-administering the doses and thereby ending their own lives.67 
Oregon accomplished this through the establishment of the aptly-
named “Oregon Right to Die” political committee, consisting of 
various businessmen, lawyers, and medical professionals.68 The 
committee drafted several variations of the bill before settling on 
																																																						
60 Id. 
61 Id. at 199. 
62 Id. at 206. 
63 Id. 
64 Id. at 212-13. Dr. Jack Kevorkian was an American pathologist who rose to 
infamy by assisting terminally ill patients with ending their lives. He had a 
significant impact on the modern debate about physician-assisted suicide. 
65 Id. at 213. 
66 Samuel Wells & Ben Quash INTRODUCING CHRISTIAN ETHICS. 329 (John 
Wiley and Sons 2010). 
67 See Center for Disease Prevention & Epidemiology – Oregon Health Division, 
Physician-Assisted Suicide. 1997. 
http://public.health.oregon.gov/DiseasesConditions/CommunicableDisease/CDS
ummaryNewsletter/Documents/1997/ohd4623.pdf (published on November 11, 
1997). 
68 See Death with Dignity, Oregon Death with Dignity Act: A History. 
https://www.deathwithdignity.org/oregon-death-with-dignity-act-history/ (last 
visited February 17, 2017). 
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“Measure 16,” which is what is now referred to as the “Death with 
Dignity Act.”69 Oregon voters approved of the Death with Dignity 
Act by a margin of 51.31% to 48.69%.70 The Act made physician-
assisted suicide legal within the state of Oregon under certain 
circumstances, and it provided a number of safeguards to prevent 
abuse, mistake, and coercion.71 
The Oregon Death with Dignity Act (the “Act”) allows a 
patient to request a prescription for a lethal dose of medication that 
would terminate the patient’s life.72 A patient requesting this must 
have been diagnosed with a terminal illness that would otherwise 
kill the patient within six months, and the request must be made 
twice orally and once in writing.73 The two oral requests must be 
separated by a period of at least 15 days, and the written request 
must be signed in the presence of two witnesses.74 The requests must 
all be voluntary and initiated by a competent patient who has 
reached the age of majority.75 The physician who will prescribe the 
medication must consult with another physician to determine the 
diagnosis of the illness as terminal.76 Moreover, a medical 
professional potentially involved in this process is allowed to refuse 
to participate on moral grounds.77 The request must be attested to by 
two disinterested witnesses, one of whom must not be a family 
member.78 There are various procedural safeguards in place to 
ensure that the terminally ill patient is making this decision 
voluntarily and competently.79 Further, the patient may retract the 
request at any time during the process.80 
As mentioned above, the enactment of the Act was 
accomplished through a ballot measure. A subsequent ballot 
measure to overturn the prior one was unsuccessful.81 In fact, the 
margin by which the measure to repeal the Act passed was greater 
than the initial measure.82 Initially, a federal district court judge 
placed a temporary injunction on the implementation of the Act; the 
																																																						
69 OR. REV. STAT. § 127.800 (2016). 
70 Oregon Secretary of State, Initiative, Referendum and Recall: 1988-1995, 
Oregon Blue Book. http://bluebook.state.or.us/state/elections/elections21.htm 
(last visited February 20, 2017) [hereinafter “Initiative, Referendum and 
Recall”]. 
71 See generally OR. REV. STAT. § 127.800 et seq. (West 2017). 
72 OR. REV. STAT. § 127.800 § 2.01 (West 2017). 
73 OR. REV. STAT. § 127.800 § 3.06 (West 2017). 
74 OR. REV. STAT. § 127.800 § 3.08-.09 (West 2017). 
75 OR. REV. STAT. § 127.800 § 2.01 (West 2017). 
76 OR. REV. STAT. § 127.800 § 3.02 (West 2017). 
77 OR. REV. STAT. § 127.800 § 4.01 (West 2017). 
78 OR. REV. STAT. § 127.800 § 3.09 (West 2017). 
79 OR. REV. STAT. § 127.800 § 3.01-.14 (West 2017). 
80 OR. REV. STAT. § 127.800 § 3.07 (West 2017). 
81 See Initiative, Referendum and Recall, supra note 69.  
82 Id. 
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injunction became permanent in August 1995, and both parties 
appealed on various legal issues.83 In 1997, the United State Court 
of Appeals for the 9th Circuit dismissed the claim on jurisdictional 
grounds, effectively terminating the injunction and deferring to 
Oregon’s right to develop its own laws.84 Although there have been 
various attempts to repeal the Act or withhold the lethally prescribed 
drugs, Oregon’s Death with Dignity Act remains the law. 
Over a decade passed before physician-assisted suicide was 
legalized in another state. In 2008, Washington submitted for a vote 
“Initiative 1000,” which is what is now referred to as Washington’s 
own “Death with Dignity Act.”85 Unlike the initial ballot measure in 
Oregon, Initiative 1000 was approved by a greater margin – 57.82% 
to 42.18%.86 A similar measure submitted to the public in 1991 had 
been rejected by the voters87, but unlike that measure, which would 
allow the physicians to administer the lethal doses of medication, 
Initiative 1000 required the patient to self-administer the 
medication.88 
The law contains similar procedural safeguards to the 
Oregon Act and some opt-outs.89 For instance, individual hospitals 
can choose to refuse to participate in physician-assisted suicide as 
long as it explicitly states its position to do so in the policies and 
procedures that the hospital makes available to its staff.90 Like the 
Oregon statute, the Washington Death with Dignity Act contains 
requirements of competency, a series of requests, and some waiting 
periods between requests and prescription of the medication.91 Upon 
a close reading of Washington’s Act, it appears that it closely 
mirrors the Oregon Act due to similarly tracked language. 
The next state to legalize physician-assisted suicide, 
Montana, did so in a different way – through a court ruling. Robert 
Baxter was an elderly, retired truck driver residing in Montana who 
had been diagnosed with terminal lymphocytic leukemia.92 As he 
																																																						
83 See Lee v. Oregon, 869 F.Supp. 1491 (D. Or. 1994; affirmed by 891 F.Supp. 
1439 (D. Or. 1995). 
84 See Lee v. Oregon, 107 F.3d 1382 (9th Cir. 1997). 
85 See generally R.W.C.A. § 70.245 et seq. (West 2017). 
86 See Washington Secretary of State, Initiative Measure 1000 concerns 
allowing certain terminally ill competent adults to obtain lethal prescriptions, 
http://results.vote.wa.gov/results/20081104/Initiative-Measure-1000-concerns-
allowing-certain-terminally-ill-competent-adults-to-obtain-lethal-
prescriptions.html (last visited February 15, 2017). 
87 See Death With Dignity, Washington Death with Dignity Act: A History, 
https://www.deathwithdignity.org/washington-death-with-dignity-act-history/ 
(last visited February 15, 2017). 
88 R.W.C.A. § 70.245.010 (West 2017). 
89 R.W.C.A. § 70.245.190 (West 2017). 
90 Id. 
91 R.W.C.A. § 70.245.020 to .130 (West 2017). 
92 Baxter v. Montana, 354 Mont. 234, 237 (2009). 
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began to receive chemotherapy treatments, they became less and 
less effective.93 Without a cure and with no prospect for recovery, 
Mr. Baxter wanted to ingest a lethal dose of medication that he could 
self-administer at the time of his choosing in order to end his pain 
and suffering.94 He filed an action along with four physicians and an 
organization called “Compassion & Choices” seeking to establish a 
constitutional right to receive and provide aid in dying.95 The state 
argued that Montana’s constitution conferred no such right.96 The 
district court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs, and Mr. Baxter died that 
same day.97 The district court held that “constitutional rights of 
individual privacy and human dignity, taken together, encompass 
the right of a competent, terminally-ill patient to die with dignity.”98 
The Montana Supreme Court vacated the district court’s 
resolution of the constitutional issues and declined to state its 
holding on that basis. Rather, it based its holding on an alternate 
statutory basis.99 Namely, the court said that physicians may use the 
state’s consent statute as a defense, stating, “[t]he consent of the 
victim to conduct charged to constitute an offense or to the result 
thereof is a defense.”100 The court dismissed the Appellants’ 
argument that the exception to this type of consent as “against public 
policy” was inapplicable because “courts that have considered this 
issue yields unanimous understanding that consent is rendered 
ineffective as ‘against public policy’ in assault cases characterized 
by aggressive and combative acts that breach public peace and 
physically endanger others.”101 The court stated that there was 
“nothing in Montana Supreme Court precedent or Montana statutes 
indicating that physician aid in dying is against public policy.”102 
Although there have been attempts to circumvent the ’court’s 
determination through the legislature, these have been unsuccessful, 
and physician-assisted suicide remains legal at common law. 
A few years after the Montana decision, Vermont became 
the fourth state to legalize the practice.103 Prior to the passage of the 
law, a poll conducted indicated that 74% of voters in that state 
favored “mentally competent, terminally ill patients with less than 
six months to live to be able to end their life in a humane and 
dignified manner, using prescription medications they can self-
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administer.”104 Unlike Oregon and Washington, however, Vermont 
did not put it to a vote of the people. In May 2013, the Vermont 
General Assembly voted to approve “Act 39,” which is more 
commonly referred to as the “Patient Choice and Control at the End 
of Life Act.”105 This was a departure from the practice of citizens 
drafting the bill and proposing it as a ballot measure. Instead, it was 
designed by lawmakers and put to a vote in the state legislature.106 
This Act is also extremely similar to the statutes passed in 
Oregon and Washington. The various waiting periods and methods 
of requesting the prescription, as well as the physician’s role in the 
process, bear a striking resemblance to the related statutes in those 
two other states.107 Like the other two states that had legalized 
physician-assisted suicide prior to Vermont’s Act, the Vermont 
required residency and stated that insurance companies may not 
deny benefits that would be otherwise conferred simply because a 
patient acts in accord with the Act.108 However, a patient loses his 
or her protections if he or she takes the prescribed medication 
outside of Vermont’s jurisdiction.109 This might implicate the 
patient’s insurance rights, as the death may be ruled a suicide in a 
state where ingesting the medication is illegal. 
On June 9, 2016, the California legislature passed the “End 
of Life Option Act,” making it the fifth state to legalize physician-
assisted suicide.110 In November 2016, Colorado joined the fold as 
the sixth state and its citizens approved “”the “End of Life Options 
Act,” with 64.87% of those who voted in favor of the ballot 
measure.111 Polling in both of these jurisdictions indicated that a 
majority of the voters polled supported physician-assisted suicide in 
the circumstances anticipated by the statutory language.112 These 
Acts also contained the same requirements and safeguards as those 
of other states, and they were mainly guided by those states in both 
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the drafting of the legislative/ballot measures and the 
implementation thereafter.113 
Finally, the most recent jurisdiction to legalize physician-
assisted suicide was the District of Columbia. The bill, named the 
Death with Dignity Act, was introduced in the Council of the 
District of Columbia (the unicameral legislative body of that 
district),114 signed by the Mayor, and sent to the United States 
Congress for review. Ultimately, attempts to oppose the bill’s 
passage were unsuccessful, and the law became effective on 
February 20, 2017.115 It is worth noting that, as of the date of this 
Note, seven jurisdictions have legalized the practice of physician-
assisted suicide, and six of these have done so within the past 
decade. So, it appears that the momentum of legalizing physician-
assisted suicide is on the rise, at least for now. 
In all other jurisdictions, physician-assisted suicide remains 
prohibited under state law. Before examining the various 
justifications and defenses both in favor of and against the practice, 
it is necessary to briefly examine the current legal status of 
physician-assisted suicide in all jurisdictions but these seven. 
B. Prohibitions Against Physician-Assisted Suicide 
 In January 2014, New Mexico looked as if it would join 
Montana as the second state to have physician-assisted suicide 
legalized at common law.116 The plaintiffs were physicians and a 
patient who was currently in remission from uterine cancer, but 
feared its return and wanted the “‘peace of mind’ of knowing that 
aid in dying would be an option available to her if she [found] her 
suffering in the terminal stage of her cancer unbearable.”117 The 
State objected and emphasized that the state had a compelling 
interest in criminalizing physician aid in dying.118 A district court 
judge ruled that physicians who rendered aid in dying to their 
patients could not be prosecuted under the state’s Assisted Suicide 
Statute.119 The court stated: 
  
“This court cannot envision a right more fundamental, more 
private or more integral to the liberty, safety and happiness 
of a New Mexican than the right of a competent, terminally 
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117 Id. 
118 Id. at *7. 
119 Id. 
74 THE EXPANSION OF THE “RIGHT TO DIE” VOL. I 
	
ill patient to choose aid in dying. . . . If decisions made in the 
shadow of one’s imminent death regarding how they and 
their loved ones will face that death are not fundamental and 
at the core of these constitutional guarantees, then what 
decisions are?”120 
 
Several days later, the court entered a declaratory judgment 
and an injunction to that effect.121 The State of New Mexico 
appealed, and the Court of Appeals of New Mexico held that 
physician-assisted suicide was neither a fundamental liberty interest 
protected by due process nor inherent in an individual’s right to life, 
liberty, and happiness.122 Upon writ of certiorari to the Supreme 
Court of New Mexico, that court affirmed the decision of the 
appellate court below, and thus physician-assisted suicide was 
prohibited by court ruling on June 30, 2016.123  
 On January 30, 2017, a “death with dignity” bill, styled the 
“End of Life Options Act,” was introduced in the New Mexico 
House of Representatives.124 A companion bill was also introduced 
in the New Mexico Senate.125 As of the date of this Note, no 
significant developments have taken place with respect to the 
progression of this legislation.126 
 In all other states, physician-assisted suicide remains illegal. 
If a physician gives renders any assistance to a patient in terminating 
the patient’s own life, the physician can be (and most assuredly will 
be) both criminally and civilly liable. In the states where all 
physician-assisted suicide is against the law, the debate rages on, 
with those on both sides of the issue approaching it from various 
angles. 
i. Arguments Against Legalization 
The arguments against the legalization of physician-assisted 
suicide are not merely moral or religious objections. The potential 
for fraud and abuse, as well as the possible difference in statutory 
interpretations that might be given where the statute is ambiguous, 
are worthy of attention and belong in any discussion about whether 
the practice should be legalized in that particular jurisdiction. 
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Of course, there is the moral opposition to the procedure, and 
in a nation that is vastly religious (whether it be Christian or 
otherwise), the gravity of that certainly should not be downplayed 
as (at the very least) a passive influence on opponents of physician-
assisted suicide and the debate in general. Various denominations 
and sects are split on their views regarding the practice of physician-
assisted suicide.127 Most adherents to Christianity oppose the 
practice, claiming that God is the ultimate judge and that the 
determination of when and in what manner to die is left to Him, not 
human preferences.128 Buddhists believe that assisted suicide runs 
contrary to the basic tenet of Buddhism that one should not kill 
another living being, but followers of the religion recognize feel 
differently about refusal of medical treatment, especially when 
pointless.129 Several other religions also decry the practice under a 
“slippery-slope” argument, whereby physician-assisted suicide 
could extend from the very terminally ill to other vulnerable 
populations based on preconceived notions of self-worth and social 
status.130 
Unrelated to moral and religious objections are the practical 
difficulties that may arise; for instance, determining the competency 
of individuals. What distinguishes a competent individual from an 
incompetent one can sometimes be easy. For example, an 
ambulatory person with terminal cancer may still be able to speak 
and reason, and so would likely be competent, whereas the injured 
in Cruzan was in a permanent vegetative state and obviously 
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128 John B. Mitchell, My Father, John Locke, and Assisted Suicide: The Real 
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130 Margaret Somerville, Is Legalizing Euthanasia an Evolution or Revolution in 
Societal Values?, 34 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 747, 773 (2016) (“A chilling example 
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incompetent.131 However, difficulties arise when the lines are 
blurred. For instance, many individuals may experience periods 
called “lucid intervals” where they are fully competent for purposes 
of legal efficacy.132 During a lucid interval, a person may fully 
understand the implications of his or her decision, as well as the 
gravity of his or her situation, and wish to seek aid in dying from the 
physician in a completely competent state.133 There are obvious 
difficulties with this factual scenario that indicate that the presence 
of a cognitive disorder alone cannot be determinative of the 
competency level necessary to request physician-assisted suicide.134 
The various areas of the law where a competency 
determination is a prerequisite for carrying out some sort of legally 
significant act does not bring clarification to this issue. There are 
varying degrees of competency required to enter into a contract, to 
marry, to divorce, to write a living will, etc.135 Which one is the best, 
and why is it the best?136 There are arguments to be made at all 
competency levels, and the fact that such arguments are out there 
introduces wrinkles into determining competency for such an 
irreversible decision.137 Opponents of physician-assisted suicide 
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maintain that these wrinkles bolster their reasoning for statutes 
against physician-assisted suicide, since “competency” is seemingly 
vague. 
Many medical professionals consider the practice of 
physician-assisted suicide to violate the Hippocratic Oath.138 The 
Oath states, “I will give no deadly medicine to anyone if asked, nor 
suggest any such counsel.”139 Opponents of physician-assisted 
suicide argue that the practice runs contrary to the Hippocratic Oath, 
which is prominently displayed to the public as well as revered by 
most who practice medicine.140 
 
ii. Arguments in Favor of Legalization 
 
 Proponents of physician-assisted suicide contend that a 
person should be able to die with dignity.141 The terminally ill cancer 
patient that continues to suffer day in and day out should be able to 
die on his or her own terms, not continue to suffer in front of family, 
friends, and caretakers, and thus be subjected to indignities. In fact, 
the legislation passed in Oregon, Washington, and the District of 
Columbia all contain the word “dignity” in the Act, and that is part 
of the justification given for their passage. Supporters of physician-
assisted suicide laws argue that states should not force people to 
depend on others for even the most menial of tasks or to powerlessly 
sit by and watch the hours tick by as they count down to their 
impending demise.142 
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 Moreover, autonomy in choosing when one will die, when it 
is determined that one will inevitably die within a specified time 
period, is important to advocates of physician-assisted suicide 
because it allows competent individuals to request the expedition of 
their death.143 Terminally ill patients are already severely lacking in 
their own personal liberties, so extending this right to them as a form 
of liberty can be benign and sympathetic while also remaining 
within the constitutional confines of personal liberty.144 Proponents 
of physician-assisted suicide liken prohibitions against terminally ill 
patients requesting aid in dying to be a severe deprivation of 
personal liberty: “The exercise of the right to privacy (in the 
personal autonomy sense), can become a means to protecting 
dignity, and protecting dignity in this context can assure that one of 
our most important private choices is secure. The two rights provide 
complementary protections.”145 
 There are several procedural safeguards in the states that 
have extended the right to physician-assisted suicide, and several of 
them are identified above. These include: a minimum age, 
voluntariness with the opportunity to rescind, the requirement that 
the patient competently make the request more than once, 
encouragement to seek counseling, and several others.146 While 
opponents of this idea have suggested that people will flock to these 
states—that reality is not borne out by the data—primarily because 
these state statutes also contain a residency requirement.147 
Moreover, the number of people that may seek physician-assisted 
suicide and obtain it is severely limited by the fact that at least one 
physician must diagnose the patient with a terminal illness that will 
kill the patient within six months.148 These standards and 
requirements are so exacting and strong that they are subject to no 
more abuse than any other statute guaranteeing a personal liberty, 
and arguably, they are subject to less abuse. 
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iii. Comparison with Other Legal Standards 
 
In some states and countries, a criminal charged with an 
offense punishable by death may, once sentenced to death, forego 
all of his appeal rights and “volunteer” to let the death sentence be 
carried out.149 Some scholarly articles have suggested that this act is 
comparable to physician-assisted suicide.150 The death row inmate 
knows that, in all likelihood, he will presumably face death; he is 
statutorily allowed to face it as soon as plausible if he foregoes his 
appeal rights. That reasoning fits squarely with the terminally ill 
patient who knows she is about to die as well.151 In order for a 
prisoner to abandon all appeals in this manner, the Supreme Court 
has required that he make a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent 
waiver of his rights to appeal and be mentally competent.152 Mental 
competence is not a high bar.153 The Supreme Court recognized that 
this standard permits even severely mentally ill defendants to be 
found competent to waive certain trial rights, even if they are 
otherwise mentally incompetent in other respects.154 Thus, prisoners 
have less procedural protections than terminally ill patients seeking 
to die in states where physician-assisted suicide is legal, and yet 
courts have said that even these minimum protections for prisoners 
do not violate the Constitution.  
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Another area in which the law has developed more 
thoroughly in an analogous way is the issue of abortion rights.155 As 
with physician-assisted suicide, abortion rights allow a woman to 
maintain autonomy in choosing the manner, method, and time in 
which to deliver her child (if she choose to do so at all). The 
Supreme Court uses the “fetal viability” standard to determine 
whether a woman’s rights to seek an abortion are being infringed 
upon.156  The rationale behind allowing abortion in limited 
circumstances (which many of the most staunch pro-life advocates 
offer as justifiable causes for doing so) – such as rape, incest, and 
the endangerment of the mother’s life – can be properly extended to 
physician-assisted suicide as well because of the exigent 
circumstances that must exist (in the states that allow physician-
assisted suicide) for a patient to request such action. Certainly, 
inherent in these exceptions that pro-life and pro-choice advocates 
have carved out is the “freedom to choose.” The woman who was 
raped wants to be able to choose to have a child rather than have it 
foisted upon her; the woman who is having a child as a product of 
incest desires the freedom to have a baby that is healthy and without 
the many genetic abnormalities that are more likely to arise as a 
result of mating within one’s own gene pool; and the mother whose 
life is in danger due to complications during delivery may wish to 
preserve her own life over the life coming into being. The reasoning 
is similar in that a patient knows that he is going to die, and he 
simply wants the freedom to choose a more expeditious death 
process.157 
 
III.  STATE PATHWAYS TO LEGALIZATION 
 
 Thinking back to Justice O’Connor’s concurrence in 
Cruzan, she believed that states should be free to retain and develop 
a basic constitutional “right to die” that is inherent in due process 
considerations.158 She believed the interpretation of this right, 
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including how far to extend the right, is best left to the states.159 This 
is markedly different than the Court’s other forays into foisting the 
widespread adoption of certain liberties on all states through 
preempting state action through a court ruling.160 In an age where 
the Tenth Amendment is mostly a truism due to federal regulation 
and oversight, leaving issues like this up to states is a means of 
giving the states back the powers that they should have rightly been 
exercising in the first place. There is an inevitable tension that arises 
when thinking about whether to expand a federal right, for 
expanding a federal right always places burdens upon states, as they 
must observe it regardless of their own statutes or state constitutions. 
As this issue has been left (at least for now) within the discretion of 
the states, the states that are considering whether to legalize the 
practice of physician-assisted suicide must decide the best approach 
to handling the issue, especially if a state’s ultimate decision is to 
authorize the practice. 
 
A.  Legislative Action vs. Judicial Activism 
 
 There are two methods whereby physician-assisted suicide 
can be legalized – through legislative action (whether it be 
representative democracy or pure direct democracy) or through 
judicial review. Currently, only one state has indirectly authorized 
physician-assisted suicide in certain situations through the 
judiciary.161 There is a separation of powers consideration inherent 
in discerning whether a constitutional issue like physician-assisted 
suicide should be decided by the legislature or the judiciary162. For 
a number of reasons, the judiciary is not the proper place to resolve 
this important question. Judicial action exists to determine the 
constitutionality and validity of laws,163 but with a controversial 
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topic involving states’ rights that are not necessarily well-settled, the 
more proper place is the legislature.164 
 Five states have now implemented ballot measures that have 
received a majority of votes in favor of physician-assisted suicide.165 
This is a states’ rights issue, and the Supreme Court implicitly held 
as much in Gonzales v. Oregon when it deferred to Oregon’s Death 
with Dignity Act.166 The Act, contained in a ballot measure, came 
under fire with a subsequent attempt to repeal by another ballot 
measure three years later.167 As the latter measure was rejected by a 
much greater margin than the first measure passed,168 this is proof 
that the legislature embodies the will of the people, and as the 
country and states are founded on concepts of democracy, it would 
be best to let the people decide how to run their states. 
 By now, states like Oregon and Washington have empirical 
data on the usage and effects of the legislative measures they have 
passed legalizing physician-assisted suicide in certain 
circumstances. Contrary to the argument that residents would flock 
to utilize these procedures en masse, since 1997, only 1,749 people 
have been prescriptions written under Oregon’s statute; only 1,127 
of those have died as a result of consuming the prescribed dose 
(64.4%).169 With respect to more recent data obtained in Oregon, in 
2016, only 204 people received lethal doses of medication in 
compliance with the statute.170 During that year, 133 people died as 
a result of ingesting this medication; of those, 19 that died has been 
prescribed the medication during previous years.171 During 2016, 
the patients who received the prescriptions were mainly those 65 
years of age or older (80.5%) and (likely with some overlap) those 
suffering from a terminal form of cancer (78.9%).172 The data 
showed that the three most frequently mentioned end-of-life 
concerns for patients who obtained prescriptions in 2016 were loss 
of autonomy (89.5%), decreasing ability to participate in activities 
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that made life enjoyable (89.5%), and loss of dignity (65.4%).173 
This is consistent with data from previous years.174 Most notably, in 
2016, zero physicians were referred to the Oregon Medical Board 
for failure to comply with statutory requirements.175 
 Although Washington’s Death with Dignity Act was passed 
more recently, annual reports can still be found containing 
somewhat similar data. From 2009 (the first year the medication was 
available) until 2015 (the most recent obtainable data), 938 people 
received prescriptions for the medication.176 Of those, 917 ingested 
the medication and died (97.8%).177 This is somewhat higher than 
Oregon, but there appears to be no reason why some take the 
medication and some do not.178 During 2015, the patients who 
received the prescriptions were mainly those 65 years of age or older 
(73.9%) and (likely with some overlap) those suffering from a 
terminal form of cancer (72%).179 The data showed that the three 
most frequently mentioned end-of-life concerns for patients who 
obtained prescriptions in 2016 were loss of autonomy (85.8%), 
decreasing ability to participate in activities that made life enjoyable 
(86.3%), and loss of dignity (68.5%); this is consistent with data 
from previous years.180 No data was available to determine whether 
any physicians had been referred to the Washington Medical Board 
for failure to comply with statutory requirements.181 
 The laws passed in Vermont, California, Colorado, and the 
District of Columbia are simply too recent and simply do not have 
enough data to conduct a proper analysis of the law’s’ effects. It will 
be interesting to see if these states produce reports bearing 
similarities to Oregon and Washington as the conversation continues 
in states where the practice is still against the law. Similar data 
would indicate the propriety of leaving the legalization of physician-
assisted suicide in the hands of the legislature. 
 By contrast, medical professionals in the State of Montana 
have been left in a situation tantamount to “legal purgatory,” 
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because there is no guidance.182 As the Baxter case did not decide 
the constitutional question, but rather focused on determination 
guided by public policy in the absence of statutory language or case 
law on the issue, there are no clear standards by which a physician 
can be sure that his conduct in rendering physician-assisted suicide 
to a patient does not violate a criminal or civil statute. Unlike the 
procedural safeguards in Oregon, Washington, etc. that guide the 
physician in complying fully with constitutional and statutory law, 
there is no guidance under this nebulous court ruling. Even though 
the Journal of Palliative Medicine has undertaken to give physicians 
in Montana some guidance, there is still no legal regulatory 
framework for medical professionals practicing in that state to 
follow.183 
Seven years have now passed since Montana’s highest court 
decided the case, and it is becoming clear now that the lack of data 
and analysis of the effects of the case stem from the physicians 
making individual choices, under the circumstances, with no 
regulatory scheme to direct them. There are no reports, and thus no 
data to express demographics, prevalence of the practice, or a 
patient’s underlying motivations for seeking the procedure. 
Because of the disparity in analyzing the effects of the 
legalization of physician-assisted suicide in jurisdictions where it is 
a statutory right versus the jurisdiction where it is legal at common 
law, legislation is a preferable approach, as it creates a framework 
for discussions among medical professionals as well as society-at-
large. 
B. Representative Democracy vs. Direct Democracy 
Several mechanisms exist by which a bill can become a law, 
but the fundamental democratic dichotomy is whether to create a 
statutory right through representative democracy or pure 
democracy. The six jurisdictions with statutes providing for 
physician-assisted suicide are split in the manner in which they got 
there. Oregon, Washington, and Colorado instituted their laws 
through ballot measures drafted by experienced professionals and 
submitted to the people for a vote.184 Vermont, California, and the 
District of Columbia drafted bills and introduced them directly to 
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their respective legislative houses.185 While there are certainly valid 
concerns regarding representative democracy, pure democracy was 
not envisioned by the Framers of the Constitution.186 Senator John 
C. Calhoun once put this consternation quite succinctly, when he 
said, “The Government of the absolute majority instead of the 
Government of the people is but the Government of the strongest 
interests; and when not efficiently checked, it is the most tyrannical 
and oppressive that can be devised.”187 Although certainly special 
interest groups and political contributions are concerns of 
representative democracy, James Madison considered a republican 
form of government the most desirable form of government for 
checking the power of democracy.188 Further, the right to every state 
to have a “republican form of government” is manifested explicitly 
in the United States Constitution.189 If the Framers of the 
Constitution considered representative democracy the best form of 
state governance, then it seems that representative legislative action 
is more suitable to decide a constitutional issues left to the discretion 
of the states than pure direct democracy. 
 
C. Potential Positive Future Effects of Widespread Adoption 
 
Up until this point, this Note has not opined about the effects 
of widespread adoption among the states of physician-assisted 
suicide in certain circumstances and subject to the various 
procedural safeguards provided above. However speculative an 
analysis of these possible effects may be, there is at least some 
indication that providers and patients alike have benefitted in the 
jurisdictions where the possibility of physician-assisted suicide is 
available. 
Although it may seem initially insensitive, there can be no 
doubt that health care costs remain high within the United States, 
and long-term care costs pose a problem in particular.190 This is not 
to suggest that an individual should take into consideration the 
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effects of his cost burden on American society when determining 
whether to request a lethal dose of medication for his terminal 
illness. It is simply a note that allowing individuals in certain 
circumstances, many of whom do require quite expensive long-term 
care, will have an incidental effect of decreasing long-term health 
care costs in the long run, as the medication itself is relatively 
inexpensive by comparison.191 A widespread adoption could 
plausibly lead to lower long-term health care costs as people exit the 
market. 
Widespread adoption could also decrease forum shopping. 
Although states statutes do thus far contain a residency requirement, 
the actual determination of whether a person is a resident for 
purposes of the statute is left to the physician’s discretion. For 
example, in Oregon, such factors include: “an Oregon Driver 
License, a lease agreement or property ownership document 
showing that the patient rents or owns property in Oregon, an 
Oregon voter registration, or a recent Oregon tax return.”192 
Additionally, there is no minimum residency requirement.193 
Although the data does not show thousands of terminally ill people 
flocking to Oregon or Washington to establish residency for the sole 
purpose of obtaining lethal medication, it is certainly reasonable to 
posit that at least a few have done so.194 A widespread adoption 
would reduce forum shopping or “doctor shopping,” and those who 
truly wish to end their lives in a dignified and autonomous manner 
would be able to do so with physicians who have been treating them 
from the onset of their respective illnesses. 
Although this list is certainly not an exhaustive inventory of 
the prospective benefits of widespread adoption, one final 
consideration is allowing physicians more mobility. A physician 
who primarily provides long-term care may receive several requests 
from patients with terminal illnesses (who meet all the criteria 
discussed earlier) to help them end their lives. However, in 
jurisdictions where such a remedy is unavailable, the physician will 
be unable to comply with the patient’s request. The physician may 
not wish to move to any of the seven jurisdictions where the practice 
is legal. A widespread adoption by the states of physician-assisted 
suicide legislation would give physicians autonomy and, as noted in 
the statutes above, physicians who have moral objections would be 
able to remove themselves from the process without fear of 
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retribution. There are still other considerations (and of course, 
accompanying counter-arguments), but a widespread adoption 
would leave state autonomy intact while providing both direct and 
incidental benefits on federal and state levels. 
 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
 
 Physician-assisted suicide is a controversial issue that 
implicates significant constitutional issues, and the United States 
Supreme Court has indicated that it is best left to each state to 
determine whether and to what extent the “right to die” within that 
state encompasses physician-assisted suicide. After seeing how it 
has played out in the jurisdictions that have legalized the practice, 
the best option seems to be to pass a legislative measure codifying 
the methods and procedures whereby physician-assisted suicide 
may be legally carried out. Not only does this offer guidance for 
physicians contemplating whether they are able to be involved in 
such a practice, but it provides empirical data and statistical analysis 
in a way that a nebulous legal status at common law is simply unable 
to do. The information gathered from a jurisdiction that guides its 
physicians in this limited-circumstance implementation will serve to 
guide other jurisdictions as they continue to have conversations, 
about whether the “right to die” should allow a patient to die with 
dignity. Perhaps this issue could even serve as a reminder of the 
importance of state autonomy, and maybe then, the Tenth 
Amendment could come back into greater focus as more than just a 
truism.  
